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Kids Will Be Kids?
Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights
Underlying Immigration Law
DAVID B. THRONSON*
Deeply ingrained ideas about children's rights, often unacknowledged and
unexamined, shape and color the treatment of children in immigration matters.
This article seeks to uncover how critical frameworks of immigration law
simultaneously reflect and reinforce discredited approaches to children's rights.
The article explores the way in which adherence to these particular conceptions
of children's rights creates barriers to the adoption of more child-centered
approaches in immigration law. This exploration then serves as a starting point
to suggest an agenda for reform.
An Immigration Judge denied asylum to Tsion, a seventeen-year-old
applicant, in part because her credibility "cannot be determined"'
regarding central testimony about witnessing the traumatic deaths of her
parents when she was a young child.
The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that forcing Daisy and
Eric, United States citizens, to leave the United States with their father
would not cause the children sufficient hardship to justify canceling their
father's removal. The record included testimony from Eric, age nine at
the time, that he would like to stay in the United States, but no other
assessment of the impact on the children of separation from their
childhood home and customary family circle.2
At Maria 's asylum hearing, which was consolidated with that of her
parents, Maria 's father was the only witness to testify and his testimony
pertained solely to his own eligibility for asylum. An Immigration Judge
ordered Maria deported after denying her asylum claim.3
In rejecting teenager Lucienne's asylum claim, the Immigration Judge
stated that "it is almost inconceivable to believe that the Ton Ton
Macoutes could be fearful of the conversations of 15-year-old children. ""
Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1994.
' Kahssai v. INS, 16 F.3d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
2 See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 1. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).
3 Alexandrova v. INS, 162 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1998), available at No. 97-3932, 1998 WL
552811, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 1998).
4 Civil v. INS, 140 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration decisions transform the lives of children every day. As in the
examples above, these often are decisions that turn on understanding the
capacities, experiences, and perspectives of children. Eliciting narratives,
evaluating fears and hardships, and judging credibility are central to many aspects
of immigration decisions. Yet life-altering determinations in immigration matters
routinely are reached without consideration of the voices and viewpoints of
children who are directly involved.
Deeply ingrained ideas about children's rights, often unacknowledged and
unexamined, shape the way children are perceived and treated. These ideas
underlie and color our perceptions of children's abilities and roles, and they
influence the way law engages them.' Broader debates about children's rights
have largely bypassed immigration law and efforts to develop workable, child-
centered approaches in immigration law have gained little footing. Immigration
law and decisions continue to reflect conceptions of children that limit their
recognition as persons and silence their voices.
This article seeks to uncover some of the limited children's rights notions
inherent in the basic frameworks of immigration law and evident in decisions
reached in the immigration context. This exploration serves as a starting point to
discuss the way underlying notions of children's rights have hindered the
implementation of measures aimed at introducing a child-centered perspective in
one area of immigration law and to suggest needed reforms. Part I of this article
provides a brief overview of competing conceptions of children's rights. Part H
demonstrates how fundamental frameworks of immigration law, and decisions
that they produce, reflect and reinforce particular underlying conceptions of
children. Part III looks at the only provision of immigration law that explicitly
calls for consideration of the best interests of the child, special immigrant juvenile
status, and analyzes the manner in which adherence to discredited notions of
children's rights creates barriers to adoption of a child-centered approach. Part IV
suggests an agenda for reforms to enhance child-centered perspectives in
immigration law.
II. FROM PROPERTY TO PERSONS
Children's rights have always been controversial.6 Suspicion of children's
5 See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 819 (noting that family law is "'undemeath' other legal
fields in the sense that its rules about roles and duties between men and women, parents and
children, families and strangers historically and conceptually underlie other rules about
employment and commerce, education and welfare, and perhaps the governance of the state").
6 See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
1867-71 (1987).
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rights derives in part from the contrast between the real needs and dependency of
children at various stages of development and notions of autonomy and individual
choice that regularly, though not necessarily, attend the rhetoric of rights.7 Yet,
despite skepticism, there is consensus that control of children by parents, or the
State, is not absolute and that children do have rights. These rights need not be
adversarial to parents' rights; they exist not only as claims for independence and
autonomy from adults, but also as claims for care and protection by adults and
claims for relationships with adults. The ongoing challenge in developing
coherent frameworks forrithinking about children's rights, then, is to find a
balance, rooted in the relation between children and adults, that empowers
children but also acknowledges the role of parents, and that recognizes children's
needs but also parents' rights and responsibilities.8
As grounding for an exploration of children's rights in immigration law, this
section briefly introduces some of the competing ideas that have marked debate
about the development of children's rights. Though this discussion presents ideas
chronologically, the development of children's rights is anything but a linear
process. Any such telling would oversimplify the ambiguity and turbulence that is
family law.9 All of the ideas presented here have been challenged, and some
largely discredited, yet each continues to influence thinking about children's
rights in important, if contradictory, ways.'°
A. Children as Property
A conception of children as parental property is "at least as ancient as the
Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions identifying man as the procreative force.""
7 See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process
Rights of Children, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 408 (1996) ("Children, as nonvoting actors
in society, cannot advocate for their own rights. Instead, their rights are determined by others.");
see also Minow, supra note 6, at 1882-83; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1051
(1992) (noting that, "[h]istorically, children's rights have been severely limited in practice
because they depend upon adults for articulation, assertion, and enforcement").
8 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children's Rights: The
Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 816 (1999) (describing the need
for "a coherent, workable system for allocating responsibility for children in a way that
empowers parents without treating children as chattels"); see also Minow, supra note 6, at
1870-71.
9 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1039; see id. at 1037 (rejecting depiction of "American
family law as having undergone a process of transformation, from the hierarchical, patriarchal
model of the family of colonial times toward a more egalitarian model").
10 Minow, supra note 5, at 826 (noting that "traditional outline of legal doctrinal
developments governing the family in America since colonial days... expresses contemporary
preoccupations as much as it reveals the past").
Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1043; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From
Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEo. J. ON
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Early law in the United States did not recognize children as individual rights
holders independent of their parents. Children were parental, or more specifically
paternal, assets who were under the direct and extensive control of their fathers. 2
As late as "the nineteenth century, a father could enroll his male children in the
army and collect the enrollment bounty, betroth his minor female children to
persons of his choice, put his children to work as day laborers on farms or
factories and collect their wage packets.' 3 Children essentially were treated as
property, always bound to their parents and under parental control.' 4 Fathers
virtually "had an absolute right to their children, 'owning' them as if they held
'title' to them."'
5
Notions of parental property rights in children, though discredited, have
persistent influence. 16 For example, legal language used to define the custody
decision making process employs, implicitly and explicitly, the idea of children as
property. 7 At the most basic level, the very idea of "custody" implies control and
possession. 8 The rhetoric of children as "belonging" to the parent continues to
exert great force and influence on the way we think and speak about children. 9
Saying that children "belong" to parents promotes the idea that custody is more
about parental ownership than about parental responsibility to children as
persons. 20 Even as patriarchal views regarding custody have given way, notions
of children as property have lingered. Today's joint custody arrangements have
allowed "a move backward toward the more explicit treatment of children as
property--only this time the property is to be divided equally."2' Similar uses of
property-influenced rhetoric are apparent in parental variations on the statement
FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313-14 (1998) (identifying notions of children as property in Roman
law).
12 See Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1037 (noting that the United States colonial law
"employed a property theory of paternal ownership and treated children 'as assets of estates in
which fathers had a vested right.... Their services, earnings, and the like became the property
of their paternal masters in exchange for life and maintenance').
" Woodhouse, supra note I1, at 314.
14 Id. (noting that lines "between persons and property, were patrolled and reinforced by
age as well as by race. It was simply a fact of economic and social life that all children were
'bound' to somebody").
15 Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 737 (1988).
16 See Gary A. Debele, A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best
Interests Standard, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 75, 89 (1998).
17 Fineman, supra note 15, at 737.
18 Id.
19 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1042.
20 Under this view, children "being naturally dependent, belong to the individuals who
create them until majority, when they acquire the status of independent individuals." Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1747,1811 (1993).
21 Fineman, supra note 15, at 739-40.
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that "the child is mine and it is nobody's business what I do with it." Such
statements continue to have great rhetorical force and influence society's frequent
reluctance to intervene in families on behalf of children.22
A modem children as property model "asserts not that children are property
but that our culture makes assumptions about children deeply analogous to those
it adopts in thinking about property., 23 Parental authority is exercised as a
parental right, "like rights in property, as a right of possession and control. 2 4 A
property theory thus "conceptualizes parental rights as being virtually absolute
and an end in themselves, rather than as an outgrowth of parents' responsibilities
and a means to secure the well-being of their children., 25 Viewing children as
property grounds parental authority solely in notions of parental rights and
ignores any suggestion that parents must earn authority through meeting their
obligations and responsibilities toward children.26 Parents are individual rights
holders, in this view, but children are not. This emphasis on parental rights
objectifies children and marginalizes their existence as independent persons.
B. Children as Wards
The traditional notion of parental possession of children was confronted in
the late nineteenth century by "reformist discourse [which] viewed children not so
much as individual property... but as a form of social investment in which
custody produced concomitant social duties on the part of each parent, the
performance of which the state could supervise. 27 Progressive Era reformers,
such as the settlement house workers, "launched a 'child-saving' movement with
a focus on children's welfare, confidence in experts, and acceptance of the
22 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1044. In contrast, the state in other instances readily
intervenes to reinforce parental authority, such as adjudicating children as "incorrigible" or "in
need of supervision" at the parents' request. Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice:
Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1579-80
(1996).
23 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1042.
24 Woodhouse, supra note 20, at 1811.
25 Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 313; see also James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting
the Public into the Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 963, 966 (2001). Dwyer notes:
most arguments about child-rearing issues give little attention to, and often simply ignore,
the developmental interests of the children involved. Instead they focus on the interests and
rights of parents, of the rest of society (e.g., societal interests in pluralism, in creating good
citizens, or in avoiding public expense) and of other individual adults who claim to be
affected by state policies.
Id.
26 Woodhouse, supra note 20, at 1811 (asserting that grounding parental authority in
"notions of right rather than obligation and earned authority neglects children's need for adult
responsibility').
2' Fineman, supra note 15, at 737.
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government as a paternal presence in children's lives." 28 New institutions and
laws treated children as qualitatively different from adults. Compulsory
education, child labor laws, child welfare agencies, and juvenile courts all
challenged parents as the locus of authority over children.29
Articulations of children's rights were premised on children's "essential
nature," emphasizing children's vulnerability and need for nurture and
protection.3° Children's rights "operated both as standards for parental behavior
and as limitations on parental power. Parental failure to live up to these standards
violated children's rights and justified community intervention." 31 The
community claimed a high stake in children and, correspondingly, children's
"highest duty was no longer obedience to parents, but preparation for
citizenship.
' 32
In a sense, parents were not viewed as property owners, but as fiduciaries.
For the benefit of the community as a whole, children were seen as persons in
need of protection and guidance as they moved toward adulthood.3 3 While a
parent fiduciary wields great power, this authority is not wielded solely for the
benefit of the child beneficiary. Common articulations of children's rights
"reflected a sense of the child not as private property of his parent, nor of himself,
but as belonging to the community, the collective family. '34 This communitarian
perspective, coupled with the focus on children's dependency and vulnerability,
failed to consider children as individual persons with their own rights.
During this time, the "best interests of the child" standard emerged as the
prevailing substantive legal principle in determining the fate of children.35 In
removing children from adult courts to specially created juvenile courts,
reformers rejected an emphasis on punishment in favor of a therapeutic focus on
21 Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 279
(1995); see also Espenoza, supra note 7, at 414 ("In the early 1900s, the parens patriae power
emerged from common law chancery to justify action by the state against parents.").
29 Debele, supra note 16, at 85-86.30 See Kristine K. Nogosek, It Takes a World to Raise a Child. A Legal and Public Policy
Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact on Unaccompanied Minor
Asylees, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (noting influence of "European attitude that children
are developmentally incomplete emotionally, morally and cognitively, rendering them
psychologically vulnerable, and.., therefore dependent on adults"); see also Woodhouse,
supra note 7, at 1056.
3 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1052; see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 138 ("A doctrine of parens patriae has
served throughout the nation's history to establish government's right and duty to step in to
protect the best interests of children, even against the wishes of their parents.").
32 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1051.33 Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 314.
34 Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 1054; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)
(stating that children are "always in some form of custody").
3 Debele, supra note 16, at 81; Fineman, supra note 15, at 737.
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guidance and treatment.36 In juvenile courts, procedural rights were limited for
children who were categorically "believed to be vulnerable, a condition that
makes them either incapable of effectively or knowingly executing rights, or
otherwise in need of an overriding parens patriae protection vested in the state.' 37
Special treatment and protections, not rights, were grounded in the presumed
weakness and vulnerability of all children. This approach quickly became the
target of the next generation of reformers who thought the special protections for
children in juvenile courts not worth the surrender of procedural protections.3a
While the special protections provided in juvenile courts distinguished children,
as a group, from adults, they stopped short of recognizing children as individual
persons.
39
C. Children as Adults
"Liberationists" found institutions such as juvenile courts and child labor
laws "disrespectful to children as persons and confining to their liberties and
capacities for choice. ' 4° Notions of children as dependent due to their
vulnerabilities were thought to reflect histories of subjugation and were rejected.41
The best interests standard, they argued, was too often invoked not as a means to
inject children's voices into decision making, but rather as "a rationalization by
decision-makers justifying their judgments about a child's future, like an empty
vessel into which adult perceptions and prejudices are poured." 2 Liberationists
challenged the assumption that all children are legally incompetent until they
reach the age of majority, arguing instead for a presumption of competence until
individualized assessment demonstrated otherwise. 43 For liberationists, the
"language of 'rights' offered a way to argue for both more protection and more
independence for a variety of children.""
In certain limited contexts, a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s
and 1970s "began to recognize children as distinct individuals deserving a direct
36 Espenoza, supra note 7, at 415; Minow, supra note 28, at 279.:
37 Espenoza, supra note 7, at 418-19.
31 Minow, supra note 28, at 280.
3, Espenoza, supra note 7, at 427 ("The parens patriae position used by the state limited
the rights of the children by articulating a protective function that trumped the due process
protection claimed by the class. Unfortunately, as a result, these children exist as objects and not
individuals.").
40 Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've Been, And Where We're Going, 68
TEMPLE L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1995). "Perhaps ironically, some of the most vivid issues cast as
claims of rights for children arose in response to the institutions created by a prior generation of
child advocates." Minow, supra note 28, at 278.
41 Minow, supra note 40, at 1575.
42 Hillary Rodhan, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDUC. REv. 487, 513 (1973).
41 Id. at 507-09.
"Debele, supra note 16, at 89.
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relationship with the state under a legal regime protecting liberties against both
public and private authorities.' 45 Perhaps most famously, the Supreme Court's
ruling in In re Gault 6 assured a right to counsel,47 a right against self-
incrimination,48 a right to notice of charges,49 and a right to confront and cross-
examine accusers in juvenile delinquency proceedings.5 ° In other areas, the Court
upheld First Amendment rights of students51 and procedural due process rights
prior to school suspensions. 2
As much as these decisions demonstrated shifting views of children, they also
"reflected social science criticisms of the juvenile court, national turmoil over the
Vietnam War and racial tensions, and widespread legal challenges to unfettered
authority."53 Fundamentally, "these decisions departed from the traditional view
of children as properly subjected to parental and institutional authority beyond
state review because such authorities no longer seemed entirely trustworthy.
54
These decisions thus evidence a movement away from older approaches to
children's rights more than they reveal a move toward any coherent vision of
children's rights.55 Even as the Supreme Court recognized certain "adult" rights
for children, it refused to extend others.56 Countering movement toward adult
rights for children, traditional views emphasizing parental authority have
persisted, rejecting "rights for children as either unnecessary or harmful given
45 Minow, supra note 28, at 276; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Age of Autonomy:
Reconceptualizations of Childhood, 18 QuINNPIAc L. REv. 421, 431 (1999) ("Within the last
several decades, the law has effectively redefined children in a number of contexts as
autonomous individuals. In other cases, however, the law preserves more traditional
understandings of children and childhood.").
46 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47 Id. at 36.
41 Id. at 55.49 Id. at 33.
50 d. at 57.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
32 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
53 Minow, supra note 28, at 276.54 Id. at 277.
55 See Dolgin, supra note 45, at 439 ("In re Gault and its progeny have been widely
interpreted-and in significant part, accurately-to suggest little beyond a need to correct
inadequacies in the juvenile court system."); see also Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the
Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 303 (1998) (noting that "[i]n the years following Gault, courts frequently
proclaimed the right of children to representation, but provided remarkably little explanation
regarding the reasons or purpose for the representation").56 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-34 (1972) (allowing Amish parents to keep
their children out of high school without considering the children's perspective); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (denying the right to a jury trial for juvenile court
proceedings).
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relationships of authority and responsibility held by adults in children's lives."57
Certainly, the universal extension of adult rights to children is not, in and of
itself, a panacea. Merely extending rights to children does nothing to insure that
children are capable of effectuating their rights.5 9 Individualized assessments of
children's capacities reveal that not every child is at a developmental stage that
enables her to independently exercise all adult rights meaningfully.60 In many
instances, children lack the capacity of adults to advocate their rights and
interests.6' Therefore, while liberationist recognition of children as individual
rights holders is an advance toward treating children as persons, it is insufficient
standing alone.
Yet the determination that children lack capacity to exercise certain rights is
inherently different from the conclusion that children lack rights. The choice need
not be between an extreme position of abandoning children to their rights and
earlier paradigms in which children's vulnerabilities blocked recognition of them
as rights holders. More recent thinking on children's rights separates the question
57 Minow, supra note 28, at 281; see also Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights ", 1976 BYU
L. REV. 605, 607 (arguing that long-term interests of children risk permanent harm as the state
and parents "abandon the children to their 'rights').
58 See John E. Coons, et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991 BYU L. REv. 307, 341
("Clearly, the extreme liberationist can be understood only as a provocateur."); see also Lynne
Marie Kohm & Maria E. Lawrence, Sex at Six: The Victimization of Innocence and Other
Concerns over Children's "Rights", 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 361, 369 (1997-1998) (arguing
that "[v]esting children with legal rights per se... is not the most appropriate way to care for
their best interests"); Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 816 ("No sensible person would support an
emancipation proclamation for children; laws empowering a parent to control and make
decisions for children are clearly necessary components of a democratic society.").
'9 By merely extending rights, "children are not brought into parity with adults. Instead,
the grant of rights legitimates punishment of youth for the harm they have inflicted, while
simultaneously disadvantaging youth who are not capable of maturely exercising those rights."
Espenoza, supra note 7, at 418. "Insofar as children are not, in fact, capable of reasoning and
behaving as adults do, defining them as autonomous individuals removes from them the
protections, however paternalistic, that society affords those in a dependent status, but does not
afford them the benefits of autonomy." Dolgin, supra note 45, at 447; see also Wendy Anton
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ.
L. REV. 11, 12 (1994) (arguing that those children not "possessed of mature reason and adult
perspective... cannot assume either the prerogatives or burdens of full legal personhood");
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy,
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 475 (1983) ("To
'abandon children to their rights' not only ignores the real needs of children, but also creates
within adults a false expectation that they, too, can be-or should be-'liberated' from the
arduous demands of a parental and community commitment to childrearing.").
60 See Irene Scharf & Christine Hess, What Process is Due? Unaccompanied Minors'
Rights to Deportation Hearings, 1988 DUKE L.J. 114, 124-27 (discussing data questioning
children's ability to make knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waivers of Miranda rights).
61 Coons et al., supra note 58, at 333.
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of whether a child has rights from the question of how a child with limited
capacity might exercise those rights. Recognizing children as individuals and
acknowledging them as rights holders need not result in abandoning children to
their rights--rights need not presuppose total autonomy.62
D. Children as Persons
An emerging conception of children's rights as international human rights,
perhaps best represented by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child,63 has rapidly gained acceptance. The Convention is the most universally
adopted of all human rights charters, ratified by all but two countries in the world
within the first ten years of its existence. 64 The United States, one of the two
holdouts, has signed the Convention but has not ratified it.65 Somalia remains the
only other country that has not ratified the Convention.66 Given the international
nature of immigration and the importance of international human rights norms to
the interpretation of certain aspects of immigration law, any workable framework
for children's rights in immigration law must account for the idea of children's
67rights as human rights represented by the Convention.
The idea of children's rights as human rights provides an approach to
children's rights centered on the personhood of children.6 Children have rights
61 See Minow, supra note 6, at 1879.
61 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Convention].
64 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Keynote Address, Symposium on Legal Reform and
Children 's Human Rights, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 331,333 (2000).
61 Id. at 333-34. For discussion of the ongoing debate over U.S. ratification, see Roger J.R.
Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too Radical for American
Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 237 (1994); Kevin Mark Smith, The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Sacrifice of American Children on the Altar of
Third-World Activism, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 111 (1998); David P. Stewart, Ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 161 (1998).
66 Woodhouse, supra note 64, at 333-34.
67 For purposes of the current discussion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) acknowledges that even if the United States has not ratified a particular treaty, treaty
provisions provide guidance as to applicable human rights norms. ASYLUM DIVISION AND
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE BAsIC
LAW MANUAL: U.S. LAW AND INS REFUGEE/ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS 12-13, 24 (1994);
Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Regarding Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims 2 n.1 (Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with
author); see also Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy A. Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting
the Most Vulnerable Asylum Seekers, 75 No. 21 INTERPRETER RELEASES 757, 760 (June 1,
1998).
68 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: The Role and Place of
International Law in the Pursuit of Durable Solutions, 3 INT'L J. CHILDREN'S RTS. 405, 410
(1995) (hailing the Convention as "a model of the achievable").
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not because they are sufficiently adult-like or because of their particular
vulnerabilities. Children are cast simply as human beings who deserve the kind of
dignity and respect that the rhetoric of human rights signals.69 Children therefore
are rights holders, even in instances where the child may lack capacity to exercise
rights autonomously.7° Parents, families, and the community are trustees, charged
with assisting children in the assertion of their rights. They act on behalf of
children, not themselves or the community. The Convention therefore turns
children "from family possessions into individual agents, from objects into
subjects.'
Implementation of the approach of the Convention rests on two fundamental
ideas. First, the Convention assures "to the child who is capable of forming his or
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age
and maturity of the child. ' 72 This principle "imposes procedural responsibilities
on [decision makers] to provide suitable circumstances and adequate
opportunities for a child to freely and fully articulate his or her views."73
Second, to insure that children's voices are not simply disregarded, the
Convention establishes that in "all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration., 74 Plainly, immigration decisions fall under the scope
of this provision. This provision does not mandate that the child's best interests be
the only decision criteria, but requires that decision makers not lose sight of the
child's perspective by identifying best interests as "a primary" consideration. The
requirement that the child's voice be respected limits the danger that the best
interests standard becomes a vehicle for the opinions of adults.
At the center of this approach is the principle that children possess not only
the rights reserved to all persons, but also may claim special assistance in
effectuating those rights because of their youth.75 The human rights approach
69 Minow, supra note 28, at 296.
70 Woodhouse, supra note 64, at 333.
71 Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child
Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 93 (1999).
72 Convention, supra note 63, art. 12(1).
73 Bhabha & Young, supra note 67, at 760.
74 Convention, supra note 63, art. 3(1).
75 See Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 343.
Children, in particular, are less powerful than others economically and politically, and
certainly different, and more vulnerable, physically, emotionally, and mentally. The very
content of rights children claim invoke protection against others, given such inequalities.
Rights may entail different treatment, not the same treatment, precisely in recognition of
difference between individuals and groups.
Minow, supra note 6, at 1879.
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"rejects the pretense that children are just like adults in all respects relevant to the
law.' 76 Children's lack of autonomy does not affect their status as rights holders;
it only alters the protections required to give those rights effect. The
vulnerabilities of children are seen neither as the basis of children's rights nor as
an excuse not to recognize children as rights holders.
The human rights approach protects traditional notions of family by
characterizing parents as the principal guardians of children's rights, creating "a
child-centered perspective on the rights of parents, viewing the relationship as one
of trust, rather than one of ownership. '77 This child-centered approach to
children's rights forces adults "to focus on the fact that children are not just
potential adults but also persons who live in real time, with real hopes, fears,
hurts, and joys.,,78
E. Ongoing Debate
Despite a growing international consensus centered on the human rights
approach exemplified by the Convention, conceptions of children's rights have
"failed to secure a coherent political or intellectual foundation, not to mention a
viable constituency with political clout." 79 For instance, it remains plausible to
argue "that young people deserve the same legal treatment as adults, that young
people deserve special legal protections differing from adults, and that the law
should refrain from intruding on the ordinary practices of adults responsible for
children."8° In advancing arguments for any of these outcomes in a particular
situation, however, it is no longer plausible to ignore children's voices and child-
centered perspectives that recognize children as individual persons.
IIl. CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION LAW: OBJECTS AND ADULTS
Debates about the nature of children's rights have largely bypassed
immigration law. This section explores fundamental aspects of immigration law
with an eye to uncovering the underlying conceptions of children's rights that
inform them. First, this section examines immigration law's most common
treatment of children, as dependents of adults in the context of family
76 Minow, supra note 28, at 296.
77 Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 315. Under this approach, "rights are interdependent and
mutually defining. They arise in the context of relationships among people who are themselves
interdependent and mutually defining. In this sense, every right and every freedom is no more
than a claim limited by the possible claims of others." Minow, supra note 6, at 1884 (footnotes
omitted).
71 Minow, supra note 40, at 1583.
79 Minow, supra note 28, at 287.
gold.; see also Dolgin, supra note 45, at 442 ("Children can now be understood as
dependent and loving or as autonomous and unconnected, or both at once.").
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immigration. Second, this section contrasts the treatment of children in family
contexts with the treatment of unaccompanied children in immigration
proceedings. In the family setting, "children" are conceived as objects rather than
actors, and their voices are largely ignored. In the unaccompanied setting,
"minors" are subject to the same harsh laws and procedural complexities as
adults. Through these frameworks, immigration law reinforces conceptions of
children that limit their recognition as persons and silence their voices.
A. All In the Family: Accompanied Children as Objects
The vast majority of children encountered by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) are derivatives of adults in the context of family
immigration. The conception of children established in this framework serves as
the dominant paradigm for the way children are viewed in immigration matters.
1. No "Child" Without a Parent
In laws establishing admission categories for immigrants, the concept of
"child" is extremely narrow. In immigration law, "child" is a term of art limited to
"an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age" who falls into one of six
categories.8 To qualify in any of these categories requires a particular
relationship with a parent, such as birth in wedlock, creation of a stepchild
relationship, "legitimation," or adoption. Immigration law never employs the term
"child" except in relationship to a parent and, therefore, does not conceive of a
"child" existing outside this relationship.
Notions of dependency underlie each of the qualifying conditions set out in
the definition of child. For example, a marriage ends childhood because it is seen
to alter the dependency relationship between parent and child. An adoption must
be finalized before age sixteen to create a "child" for immigration purposes-an
8" These include: (1) "a child born in wedlock;" (2) a stepchild, "provided the child had not
reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild
occurred;" (3) "a child legitimated ... if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches
the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or
parents at the time of such legitimation;" (4) "a child bom out of wedlock, by, through whom,
or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the
child to its natural mother or to its natural father if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child
relationship with the person;" (5) "a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the
child has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at
least two years;" or (6) "a child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his
behalf.., who is an orphan" and whose adoptive parents have "complied with the preadoptive
requirements." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(l)(A)-(F) (2000). Once
children marry or reach the age of twenty-one, but otherwise meet the definition of child, they
are no longer "children," but rather are considered "sons" or "daughters." Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1), (3) (2000); 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(s) (2001).
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adoption too close to the most common threshold age of adulthood provides
unconvincing evidence of the dependent status of the child. In contrast, a
stepchild may be a "child" where the relationship is established a single day
before the reaching the age of eighteen.82 Unlike the adoptee context where the
putative child is stranger to both parents, here the natural parent provides
assurance of a preexisting relationship of dependency. Likewise, requirements of
"legitimation" or a "bona-fide parent-child relationship" assure that a parent has
acknowledged the child as a dependent.
Emphasizing dependence on parents as a prerequisite to being a "child"
strongly reflects notions of the child as property. It accepts the idea that children
are not independent beings but rather are always bound to someone. Parental
possession and control, central to the idea of children as property, are the
hallmarks of a parent-child relationship in immigration law.
Moreover, while the immigration definition of "child" may serve to test the
genuineness of claims to a parent-child relationship,83 establishing the
prerequisites for eligibility in a particular category, such as legitimation, may not
be accomplished by children. Immigration law recognizes a "child" only through
parental action.84 In the absence of a parental act of legitimation, no level of proof
from the child establishing the veracity of a paternity claim would suffice to force
recognition as a "child" for immigration purposes. Parents are rights holders who
may take action to recognize a "child" for immigration purposes. Children, in
contrast, are by definition passive objects subject to parental control.
2. Family-Sponsored and Derivative Immigration
The framework of family-sponsored and derivative immigration furthers the
property-based approach set up by the definition of a child, emphasizing parental
possession and control by limiting children to passive roles. Full explanation of
the roles to which children are relegated requires a brief overview of the system of
family-sponsored immigration.
Immigration law allows citizens and permanent legal residents to petition for
family members who fall within certain limited categories to become legal
permanent residents.8 5 Both the immigration status of the sponsoring petitioner, as
either citizen or legal permanent resident, and the relationship between the
82 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(1)(B) (2000).
" See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977).84 In limited instances, state action may suffice to establish the prerequisite dependency.
See, e.g., Matter of Goorahoo, 20 1. & N. Dec. 782, 785 (BIA 1994) (noting that "when the
country where a child was born eliminates all legal distinctions between legitimate and
illegitimate children, all children are deemed to be the legitimate offspring of their natural
parents from the time that country's laws are changed"). In these instances, state action shifts
power away from parents, but not toward children.
85 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2000).
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petitioner and the beneficiary determine the priority given to the request.86 Some
relationships, such as that between a citizen parent and child, are not subject to
numerical limitation and provide for the immediate availability of an immigrant
visa.87 Others, such as the relationship between a legal permanent resident and a
child, are subject to annual numerical limitations, resulting in backlogs now
stretching as long as five years.88 The relationship given lowest priority by
immigration law, that between siblings, may require waits in excess of twenty
years.89 The law overtly prioritizes relationships comprising traditional nuclear
families over other relationships.9"
"Family-sponsored" immigrant families are not viewed as a unit, and
individual family members are not equal. The direct beneficiary of a family-
sponsored petition is typically an individual, the principal beneficiary, who has a
qualifying relationship with the sponsoring petitioner. 91 If this principal
beneficiary has a spouse or children, they generally may acquire immigration
status as "derivatives" of the principal beneficiary.92 Derivative status is available
not only for family-sponsored immigrants, but also for beneficiaries of
employment-based petitions and winners of the "diversity" visa lottery.93 Asylees
and refugees also can obtain derivative status for their spouses and children.94
This framework creates a sharp divide between active and passive
participants. Sponsoring petitioners have absolute control over the decision to file
for a potential beneficiary. No matter how close the relationship, beneficiaries
have no right to force the filing of petitions on their behalf.95 Similarly, potential
86 See id.
87See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2000). The immediate
availability of an immigration visa does not mean that immigration may take place
immediately. Processing delays often extend to periods of more than a year, even for persons
who are immediately eligible for visas.88 See DEP'T ST. VISA BULL., Feb., 2002 at 1-3.
89 See id.
90 See Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REv. 943, 955-60
(2001); Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian
Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 528 (1995).
" In fact, although "family-sponsored" is the largest immigration category, immigration
law never looks at a family as a unit, but rather as a series of individuals. The inadmissibility of
a family member (other than the principal immigrant) does not render the family inadmissible
as a whole. Only the inadmissible family member will be left behind.
92 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000).
" See id.
94 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ I 158(b)(3), 1157(c)(2) (2000).
95 Under the Violence Against Women Act, spouses and children who have been battered
or subject to extreme cruelty by a citizen or legal permanent resident spouse or parent may
qualify to "self-petition." Immigration Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 11 54(a)(l)(A)(iii), (B)(iii)
(2000). This exception recognizes the extreme power that accompanies control over the
immigration status of family members and seeks to curtail this in extreme cases by allowing the
abused to file on their own. Unfortunately, self-petitioning does not extend to cases in which the
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derivatives are reliant on principal beneficiaries. An "unfortunately common
problem with the family-based immigration regime... [is that] [d]erivative
beneficiaries are just that-derivative--meaning that they have few rights of their
own and instead depend on the competence and cooperation of the principal
immigrant."96 Seventeen-year-old Boguslaw Fornalik discovered this when his
abusive father's failure to include him in an immigration petition resulted in an
INS decision to send him alone back to Poland while leaving his mother and
siblings in the United States.97
In the framework of family-sponsored immigration, children are always
beneficiaries and derivatives; they are never petitioners for others. The law
permits parents to sponsor children but does not allow children, even citizen
children, to sponsor parents or siblings.9" For example, a child born out of
wedlock may immigrate on the basis of a parent-child relationship with one
parent. Immigration law does not then permit this child to sponsor the other
parent or any siblings. Similarly, while an adult granted asylum can reunite with a
spouse and children, a child asylee cannot reunite with parents by sponsoring
them. Furthermore, a "child" who has his or her own child faces great difficulty.
Derivative status extends only one generation from the principal beneficiary. A
young parent who otherwise qualifies as a child cannot immigrate as a derivative
without leaving her own child behind.99 This system thus conceptualizes adult
parents as active rights holders and children as passive objects subject to their
control, again reflecting notions of children as property.
The framework of family-sponsored immigration dominates the workload of
immigration decision makers and establishes the baseline conception of children
in immigration law. It is commonly noted that family-sponsored categories of
immigration regularly account for the bulk of total legal immigration. In 1998, the
last year for which the government has published full immigration statistics,
family-sponsored immigration accounted for 71.9% of all legal immigration.
100
Not all of these immigrants were children, however, and some children entered as
derivatives in non-family-based categories. A more useful figure is that one-third,
33.5%, of all permanent immigration visas were granted to children as dependents
and derivatives.' °1 Moreover, the number of children as dependents, over
principal stops short of abuse or extreme cruelty, or simply fails to act on behalf of a beneficiary
out of spite or incompetence.
96 Fomalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
9' Id. at 526-27.
98 At least not until age twenty-one, when no longer a child for immigration purposes.
99 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000).100 U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1998, 29 tbl.5, 33. Of the total 660,477
permanent visas issued, 474,848 were issued to immigrants in immediate relative and family
preference categories.
101 Id. Of the total 660,477 permanent visas issued in 1998, 221,139 were issued to
dependent children. Of family-sponsored immigrants, 37% were dependent children (from the
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220,000, dwarfs the relatively small number of approximately 5,000
unaccompanied minors annually encountered by the INS.' °2
The dominance of the family immigration paradigm establishes the property-
influenced idea of children as objects as a primary lens through which
immigration decision makers view children in immigration matters. For many
children-those whose cases are uncomplicated and who immigrate without
incident-this bias seems unimportant. But widespread conceptualization of
children as objects leaves them powerless and voiceless, creating tremendous
obstacles for children to overcome when necessary.
3. Marginalizing Children's Voices
Ingrained perceptions of children as property are reflected by immigration
decision makers in a variety of contexts, spilling over into decisions which, unlike
family-sponsored immigration, do not turn on establishing a parent-child
relationship. Outside the family-sponsored immigration context, children may, in
many instances, present independent claims for immigration status.'0 3 These
claims need not be adversarial to parents' wishes, and most often are not.1°4 Yet
enduring images of children as passive objects or as property continue to
influence decision making even when children have independent grounds for
immigration relief Such limited perspectives of children are reflected not only by
decision makers, but also by advocates and parents who do not perceive the need
to present children's voices.
Consequences of ignoring children's voices can be serious for both parent
total of 474,848 family-based immigrants, 70,472 were immediate relative children and 89,520
were family preference children or derivatives). Of all employment-based visas, 28.3% were
issued to child dependents as derivatives (21,931 of 77,517 total employment-based permanent
visas).
102 American Bar Association, Immigration Pro Bono Development Project, Fact Sheet on
Detained Immigrant and Refugee Children, available at http://www.abanet.org/immigprobono/
factsheetsimmigration.doc (July 2001) (noting that the "INS detains more than 4,600 children
annually in the U.S.").
103 For example, children may independently apply for asylum. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212
F.3d 1338, 1347 (11 th Cir. 2000); see also Bhabha & Young, supra note 67, at 758 ("Children
are, of course, technically eligible for the same protection under international refugee law as
adults."). There also is no immigration law barrier to a child's application for an employment-
based visa, though common sense and child labor laws make satisfying the requirement of a
qualifying employment offer unlikely.
X The case of Elian Gonzalez, with its direct conflict between a parent's wishes and a
child's purportedly independent claim, is highly unusual. Indeed, the rarity of the situation is
evidenced by the absence of any formal INS policy for addressing the situation. See
Memorandum from Bo Cooper, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Regarding Elian Gonzalez (Jan. 3, 2000) (on file with author). More commonly, the
relationship between unaccompanied minors and their parents is much more complex and
ambiguous. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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and child. For example, when a parent includes a child in an asylum claim, the
child may benefit from a grant of asylum as a derivative.10 5 But a denial to the
parent will apply to the child as well.' 0 6 Among refugees, for example,
"[a]ccompanied children have tended to be subsumed within their family's
asylum application; indeed both the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ... and the INS have pointed out that invisibility is a common problem
for refugee children."10' 7 Subsuming children into their parents' claim too often
means that children are ignored.10 8 This is particularly tragic when children have
individual claims that are stronger than those of their parents. For example,
children who have gay or lesbian sexual orientations may experience persecution
that would not be faced by their parents.
In some instances, removal proceedings can even take place without a child's
knowledge, let alone participation.10 9 It is not uncommon for children who are
later separated from their parents to learn that an immigration court ordered them
removed in absentia as a derivative of a parent in an immigration proceeding of
which the children had no knowledge. Prior orders of removal can cause
substantial complications, perhaps even insurmountable barriers, to future
immigration relief for the child. In such instances, children's invisibility has
enduring consequences, yet is viewed as commonplace and unremarkable.
The failure to give weight to children's perspective extends even to instances
where the law specifically makes children a central issue. Francisco Monreal
sought cancellation of removal on the basis of "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" to his two children, Eric and Daisy, who would accompany
him to Mexico if he were removed." 0 At the time of Monreal's hearing, the
Board of Immigration Appeals had not yet issued a decision establishing the
05 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2000).
'
06 See, e.g., Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1097 n.l (2000) ("Because the claims of
[Khourassany's] wife and child are derivative, their petitions are also denied in light of our
holding.").
Bhabha &Young, supra note 71, at 87.
108 See, e.g., Alexandrova v. INS, No. 97-3932, 1998 WL 552811, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998)
(noting that, despite independent claims by his wife and child, the father "was the sole witness
to testify. His testimony related solely to his own eligibility for asylum"). Often independent
claims of children are not even articulated. See, e.g., Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1001 n.I (9th
Cir. 2001) ("The application for asylum is based on Mr. Lal's experience; since the applications
of both his wife and child are derivative of his claim, we will focus on Mr. Lal's application in
this opinion.").
'09 8 C.F.R. section 3.25 allows the Immigration Judge to waive the presence of the child.
8 C.F.R. § 3.25 (2001).10 In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57, 64 (BIA 2001). A person "of good
moral character" found removable by the immigration court who has been physically present in
the United States for not less than ten years may seek cancellation of removal by establishing
that his or her removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a spouse,
parent, or child who is a citizen. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)
(2000).
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parameters of the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard. 1
Plainly the claim for relief requires a focus on the children. Yet the record
included virtually no exploration of hardship from the perspectives of the
children.1 2 The Board of Immigration Appeals noted that the children did not
"have any particular health problems" and that if removed they likely "will suffer
some hardship, and likely will have fewer opportunities," but the Board still
denied relief. 3 In failing to make a case for the children, the family lost.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this decision is not the outcome itself,
but the fact that the Board felt it could reach a decision without remanding for a
fuller record. In this decision, which now stands as the Board's fullest articulation
on the meaning of hardship to children, the children are invisible, or at best
passive objects accompanying their father. This decision sets a tone which
validates the absence of children's voices and establishes children's silence as the
norm.114
Decisions such as those discussed in this section demonstrate how
foundational ideas of children as passive objects have continuing influence. All
too often, because children are not expected to have any role or meaningful
contribution, the absence of their voices is not of concern to decision makers and
advocates.
B. All Alone: Unaccompanied Minors as Adults
If a "child" can exist only in relation to a parent, immigration law needs
another term for those children who defy this definition and either arrive
unaccompanied or find themselves unaccompanied after arrival. Most commonly,
however, immigration law provides no alternative and simply treats
unaccompanied children as adults by default. In particular circumstances,
immigration law employs "minor" as a substitute for "child," though the scattered
and inconsistent references to "minors" provide a sharp contrast to the painstaking
thoroughness with which a "child" is defined and used. 15 Less often, the term
. Monreal-Aguinaga, 56 1. & N. Dec. at 58.
"' See id. at 70 (Rosenberg, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting the "minimal amount of
evidence that was presented"). The record included no professional evaluation of the children's
language abilities, no medical or psychological reports indicating the impact of relocation, no
sociological studies reflecting the ability of United States citizen children to adapt to different
cultures and countries, and no information concerning the children's ability to maintain contact
with extended family in the United States. Id. at 72-73.
" 
3 See id. at 65.
"4 For example, Elian Gonzalez, perhaps the most publicized child immigrant of all time,
was never interviewed by the INS. Stripped of the political frenzy, the ultimate resolution of the
case was not surprising. But it is incredible that the INS never felt the need to even speak to the
child at the center of the controversy.
115 The term "minor" is not defined and is used in contradictory ways. For example, it is
used as an adjective, so that the "minor children" of a student visa holder may accompany him
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"juvenile" is used.' 1 6  "Minor" and "juvenile" are occasionally used
interchangeably, even within sentences.' 7 Unlike "child," both "minor" and
"juvenile" are terms of recent vintage in immigration law." 8
1. Why Alone?
Thousands of children arrive in the United States unaccompanied by parents
every year. More are separated from their parents after arrival. The limited
definition of "child" in immigration law cannot alter the complex reality that
thousands of children struggle through the maze of immigration law without adult
assistance. Last year alone the INS detained more than 4,600 unaccompanied
children." 9 The reasons that children arrive without their parents, or are separated
from their parents, are varied and complex.
Some children are refugees fleeing persecution. It is estimated that over half
the world's twenty million refugees and internally displaced persons are children,
and that two to five percent of these children-up to one million children-are
separated from their parents. 2 ° From the pool of refugees, only a small number of
children make it to the United States. Those already separated from their families
may make the journey on their own initiative. Parents, though, may send refugee
until age twenty-one. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(] 5)(F)(ii) (2000). In
contrast, under the heading "Minors," calculations of time unlawfully present in the United
States exempt "time in which the alien is under 18 years of age." Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § II 82(a)(9)(B)(iii). In limited instances, special service requirements apply for
"a minor under 14 years of age." 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (2001); see also J. Daniel Dowell et
al., Protection and Custody of Children in United States Immigration Court Proceedings, 16
NOVA L. REV. 1285, 1288-89 (1992) (noting immigration law's "morass of terminology"
regarding children).
116 By regulation, a juvenile is "defined as an alien under the age of 18 years." 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.3(a) (2001). In addition to seemingly excluding the possibility that U.S. citizens might be
juveniles, the definition is inconsistent with provisions that persons may be eligible for
classification as a "special immigrant juvenile" if under twenty-one years of age. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.11 (c)(1) (2001) (extending eligibility for "special immigrant" to age twenty-one).
117 "Juveniles may be released to a relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent) not
in Service detention who is willing to sponsor a minor and the minor may be released to that
relative notwithstanding that the juvenile has a relative who is in detention." 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(a)(3)(i) (2001) (emphasis added).
... The distinction in terminology between "children" and "minors" is not insignificant.
Language differences simultaneously reflect and reinforce underlying conceptions of children
and children's rights. See Espenoza, supra note 7, at 411 (arguing that "the difference in
language used [by the Supreme Court] to characterize ... children sheds some light on the
'packaging' of children, which in turn shapes the Court's perception and, hence, the rights that
will be extended to them").
19 American Bar Association, Immigration Pro Bono Development Project, Fact Sheet on
Detained Immigrant and Refugee Children, available at http://www.abanet.org/immigprobono/
factsheetsimmigration.doc (Jan. 2002).
120 See Bhabha & Young, supra note 67, at 758.
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children to the United States seeking to find a safe haven.
Other children immigrate on their own or are sent by parents simply in search
of a better life in the United States. In certain cases, a single family member is
sent in the hope that he or she will serve as an "anchor" for later resettlement of
other family members.12 1 Still other children are "kidnapped, sold or tricked and
trafficked into sexual or labor servitude."' 22 This occurs both with and without a
family's knowledge and consent.
Deciphering the motives underlying the arrival of children unaccompanied by
parents is a complex task. Increasingly, unaccompanied children arrive through
the intervention of traffickers or smugglers, even when their motivation and the
immigration relief they seek is entirely legitimate.123 The decision of parents to
place a child in the hands of a smuggler may result from a wide range of motives.
Some families may believe that they are acting in the best interests of the child,
resorting to smugglers to secure safe passage and unaware of the exploitative
practices to which such children are often exposed. 2 4 What may appear as the
height of recklessness or malice may seem quite reasonable from the perspective
of those in extreme situations. 2 5 In many instances, the judgment of children and
parents is based on misinformation or incomplete information. Other children are
victims knowingly placed in dangerous situations for the profit of their parents
and others.
Children find themselves alone after arrival as well. Parents may bring a child
to the United States, either with a temporary visa or through an illicit entry, and
leave the child with relatives or friends to raise here following the parents' return
home. While some children thus abandoned by parents may end up in a loving
home, others encounter abuse or are neglected by their caretakers. 126
Undocumented immigrant children form a portion of the children that state child
121 See Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transnational
Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269,272 (2000).
122 Id. at 275.
12' For example, children with valid claims for asylum may seek the assistance of
smugglers for entry at unauthorized points or for false documents for use at a regular port of
entry. Babies adopted by well-meaning parents may have been obtained through illicit means.
Id. at 272. The consequences of immigrating through illicit means can be serious and lasting.
Such entry may create obstacles to obtaining legal status. Moreover, many children work for
years to pay smugglers the fees charged for facilitating entry to the United States.
124 See id. at 275.
125 For example, a "Kosovar 16-year-old, orphaned and living in a refugee camp, may
agree to be a prostitute in the Netherlands and not regret the decision post-migration. An
exploitative or dangerous circumstance may be freely chosen as the most advantageous given
the available options." Id. at 284-85.
126 Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictions of Protecting
Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 597, 599 (2000).
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welfare systems remove from parents and caretakers. 127 Such children lack
permanent legal immigration status and may later find themselves in removal
proceedings or with limited options due to their lack of status. 12' Regardless of the
reason children find themselves separated from parents, those children forced to
navigate the immigration system alone face daunting barriers.
2. Adult Procedures, Adult Laws
Given that the basic framework of immigration law fails to recognize that
children exist without parents, substantive and procedural rules do virtually
nothing to account for the possibility of children in proceedings unaccompanied
by parents. When children find themselves in immigration proceedings
unaccompanied by adults, the same substantive rules, evidentiary requirements,
and procedural complexities that apply to adults also apply to them.1 29 Rather
than remedies and procedures tailored for children, children suffer the same harsh
consequences and limited procedural protections faced by adult immigrants.
The only procedural provision that distinguishes children and adults in formal
immigration proceedings is a regulation which prohibits the Immigration Judge
from accepting "an admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent
who is incompetent or under the age of 18 and is not accompanied by an attorney
or legal representative, a near relative, legal guardian, or friend."' 3° This provision
is meant to protect children from making legal admissions that they do not
understand. In lieu of accepting a legal admission, the Immigration Judge is
instructed to hold a hearing to determine the facts of entry and immigration
status.
31
In practice, INS officers interrogate the child outside the court, where there
are no safeguards in place to prevent abuse or coercion.132 Resulting "facts"
culled from these interviews, such as the child's reported birthplace and manner
of entry, are then entered onto the court record, through documents or testimony,
and the Immigration Judge makes the legal determination of removability. 3 3 Far
from aiding children, this special "protection" guarantees that children will be
127 Id.
121 See Judith Messina, Life in the Margins: Young Illegal Alien's Hopes of a Normal Life
in the United States Stifled by Deportation Fear, CRAIN'S N. Y. Bus., July 16, 2001, at 1.
129 See Bhabha & Young, supra note 67, at 757.
"0°8 C.F.R. § 240.10(c) (2001). Generally, only after removability is established are
applications for relief, such as asylum, heard.
131 Id.
132 See Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 662 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[T]he situation faced
by unaccompanied minor aliens is inherently coercive.").
133 See Terry Coonan, Tolerating No Margin for Error: The Admissibility of Statements by
Alien Minors in Deportation Proceedings, 29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 75, 91 (1998) (proposing that
various procedural requirements in the BIA system were inconsistent, and thus should be
reformed).
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interrogated by immigration officers in a setting which provides the least
protection from coercive practices. Children are treated worse than adults. 134
In all other respects, children in immigration proceedings have no procedural
protections different from those afforded adults. Charges of inadmissibility 35 or
removability 36 generally result in a hearing before an Immigration Judge.
37
Children are subject to the same grounds of inadmissibility and removal as
adults. 138 Proceedings are quite formal: judges wear robes, the government is
represented by an INS trial attorney, proceedings are taped via microphones
located at counsel tables and witness stands, witnesses testify pursuant to direct
and cross-examination, and objections to testimony and documentary evidence
are raised. This setting is intimidating and confusing for adults, and is especially
daunting to children. 9
Adult immigrants have few rights in immigration court, and child immigrants
fare no better. Child respondents, like adult respondents, have the "privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's
choosing.' 40 In practice, it is estimated that as many as ninety percent of all
respondents are unrepresented. Estimates of representation for children in
immigration proceedings are slightly better, but, even among detained children
still more than half lack legal representation.' 4' A removal proceeding is "a
134 In two lengthy decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding this practice,
the word "child" is never used, indicating little effort to see the effects of this practice from the
perspective of children. See In re Ponce-Hemandez, Int. Dec. 3397 (BIA 1999); In re Amaya-
Castro, 211. & N. Dec. 583 (BIA 1996).135 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000). Grounds of
inadmissibility apply to those newly arriving in the country.
136 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000). Grounds of
removability apply to persons in and admitted to the United States.
117 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(3) (2000) ("Unless otherwise
specified in this Act, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure
for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been
so admitted, removed from the United States.").
"'8 For example, arriving immigrants are commonly charged with inadmissibility for not
possessing a valid visa, Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(7)(A)(i) (2000), or
for fraud in the form of attempted entry with false documents. 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(aX6)(c)(i)
(2000). These grounds apply to children and adults equally.
139 See Bhabha & Young, supra note 67, at 770 ("The traditional environment, which in so
many ways is designed to inspire respect for the seriousness of the process, may intimidate
children and inhibit their ability to fully participate in the hearing.").
140 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(4)(A) (2000).
141 Elizabeth Amon, Access Denied: Children in INS Custody Have No Right to Lawyer;
Those Who Get One Risk Retaliation, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 16, 2001 Al, A16 ("Of the more than
4,600 people in INS custody under the age of 18, fewer than half have attorneys."); American
Bar Association, Immigration Pro Bono Development Project, Fact Sheet on Detained
Immigrant and Refugee Children, available at http://www.abanet.org/
immigprobono/factsheetsimmigration.doc. ("Without the right to government-appointed
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confusing and threatening process, particularly for a non-citizen, with limited
knowledge of immigration law, who is subject to interrogation by an Immigration
and Naturalization Service... attorney and the Immigration Judge.. ., and who
is unsure of what evidence to offer and how to meet the legal burdens of
proof.' 42 Not surprisingly, represented immigrants fare better in immigrant
proceedings.
143
This treatment of children as adults represents an extreme liberationist
approach to children's rights, providing children with adult rights without
consideration of their ability to effectuate them. Children are treated as adults not
because they are determined to be sufficiently mature to effectuate rights without
special procedures or supports. Rather, they simply are not "children" under
immigration law and no provision is made to distinguish them from adults. This
unthinking abandonment of children to adult status serves to silence children by
not providing them with the means to assure that their voices are heard.
One of the strongest critiques of the extreme position of treating children as
adults in immigration proceedings comes from the INS itself. Unfortunately, it
comes in the form of non-binding guidelines 144 which apply only to the small
fraction of children's cases that are heard not in immigration court but by
specialized asylum officers.145 These guidelines acknowledge that "children may
not present their cases in the same way as adults, and suggest[ ] child-sensitive
procedures intended to help Asylum Officers to interact more meaningfully with
the child during the asylum [process].' 46 For example, the guidelines call for
special training for asylum officers in techniques of child-sensitive questioning
"tailored to the child's age, stage of development, background, and level of
counsel in immigration proceedings, an estimated 10% of people detained by the INS secure
representation, including children.") (July 2001).
142 Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 394 (2000) (discussing how in light
of the complex nature of deportation hearings, immigrants should be afforded the right to
counsel).
143 For example, "[ijn FY 1999, the immigration courts granted asylum claims four to six
times as often where the claimant was represented." Susan F. Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz,
Asylum in Practice. Successes, Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589,
595 (2000) (looking at refugee and asylum policy in practice in Europe and North America).
" Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, supra note 67.
14' These so-called "affirmative" cases involve persons who have entered the United States
but are not in removal proceedings. Applicants file first with the asylum office, where their
claims are heard by a corps of asylum officers who have authority to grant asylum. If they do
not grant an asylum claim, the case is referred to immigration court for removal proceedings,
where asylum claims may be renewed before an Immigration Judge. See Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § II 58(d)(5) (2000). Unaccompanied minors who are identified and
detained by the INS are immediately placed in removal proceedings and thus will never have
the o60rtunity to file affirmatively.
Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, supra note 67, at 5.
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sophistication. 1 47 But this training does not reach beyond the small asylum
officer corps, and the overwhelming majority of immigration officers have no
training related to working with or understanding children. The stark contrast
between the child-centered approach of the guidelines and the adult reality faced
by children in immigration court highlights the extent to which children are
marginalized.
3. Worst of Both Worlds
Immigration courts are not specialized. For example, there is no asylum court
or juvenile immigration court. The decision makers who decide the fate of
children asylum seekers are the same who hear all other claims for relief. Even
though subject to the same harsh laws and procedures as adults, unaccompanied
children still struggle to overcome the dominant bias of immigration law that
children are objects and not actors.
For example, in 1992, Lucienne Yvette Civil was fifteen years old when she
began to speak out in favor of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. 148 In immigration
court, she testified that she fled Haiti because her pro-Aristide statements resulted
in her being targeted by the Ton Ton Macoutes, who threatened her at her home
in the middle of the night. In rejecting her asylum claim, the Immigration Judge
opined that "it is almost inconceivable to believe that the Ton Ton Macoutes
could be fearful of the conversations of 15-year-old children.' '149 Even substantial
and specific documentary evidence that "anti-Aristide forces viewed pro-Aristide
young people as an important source of support for Aristide, and they went to
great lengths to intimidate those young people through terror and torture"'"5 could
not shake the Immigration Judge's deeply ingrained ideas about children.
Ell. SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS: A FOOTHOLD FOR THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
Laura Arteaga was bom in Mexico and brought to the United States by her
parents at age two.' 5' Following repeated incidents of severe abuse, the State
brought proceedings to terminate parental rights and, at the age of four, Laura
became a ward of the State.' At the time parental rights were terminated,
Laura's father was a legal permanent resident, her mother was a temporary legal
resident who had applied for permanent status, and her younger sister was a
147Id. at 10.
148 Civil v. INS, 140 F.3d 52, 53-54 (1st Cir. 1998).
1491d. at 55.
"0 Id. at 64 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
151 Arteaga v. Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.
App. 1996).
15 2 Id. at 7 59.
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citizen due to her birth in the United States. Laura, however, did not have legal
immigration status in the United States.
153
State dependency in itself does nothing to alter federal immigration status.
Until the last decade, even though children such as Laura had no control over
their decision to immigrate to this country, they routinely found themselves in an
immigration predicament. They remained in state care until adulthood. Upon
release from care, they found themselves turned out to face the world without
legal immigration status and all its associated benefits, such as protection from
removal, employment authorization, and access to financial aid for college. In
1990, special immigrant juvenile status was created as an avenue to legal
immigration status for children who become juvenile court dependents.'5 4 Laura
was among the first to benefit from this underused law. 5 The number of children
benefiting from this status, which is available to both children in the United States
and those apprehended at the border, remains low.'
56
Special immigrant juvenile status remains unique in several respects. First, it
is the only provision in immigration law that expressly incorporates a best
interests of the child standard into its eligibility criteria. Second, it created a
unique hybrid system of state and federal collaboration, drawing on state child
welfare expertise to complement INS expertise in immigration matters. The
statute, therefore, not only integrates a best interests standard into immigration
law, but also locates decisions about child welfare with those most qualified to
make them.
This approach represents a radical break from the dominant modes of
thinking about children in immigration law. In stark contrast to the rest of
immigration law, implementation of the special immigrant juvenile status
affirmatively requires decision makers to view children as persons, not objects.
153 id.
154 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(27)(J) (2000). Although enacted
in 1990 as section 153 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990), necessary
technical amendments and regulations delayed implementation until late 1993. See
Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733; 58 Fed. Reg. 42850 (Aug. 12, 1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.11) (2001); see also SARAH IGNATIUS & ELIZABETH STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
THE FAMILY 14-75 (2001) ("Practitioners should be aware that this is a relatively new remedy
with many grey areas that is still in the beginning stages of becoming clarified by case law.").
155 Arteaga, 924 S.W.2d at 759.
156 Only 287 children were granted special immigrant juvenile status in 1998.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEAR 17 tbl.5, available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/imm98.pdf. Special immigrant juvenile
grants numbered 430 in 1997 and 390 in 1996. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
1997 STATISTICAL YEAR, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins
/statistics/97immttl.pdf; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1996 STATISTICAL
YEAR, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.govgraphics/aboutins/statistics/annual/fy96/
index.htm.
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But overcoming the established thinking about children has not proven easy. The
discussion below sets outs the design and underlying rationales of the special
immigrant juvenile scheme. It then turns to an exploration of the manner in which
the statute has been implemented and discusses barriers that have emerged in
practice. The difficulties encountered by children seeking relief pursuant to the
special immigrant juvenile statute not only provide a window into the persistent
influence of limited conceptions of children's rights, but also illustrate barriers to
child-centered approaches that must be addressed and overcome in any broader
attempts to reform thinking about children's rights in immigration law.
A. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status as Designed
Special immigrant juvenile status is designed to provide an avenue of
immigration relief for undocumented children who are in need of protection from
state juvenile court dependency systems.1 57 It employs a unique hybrid procedure
requiring the collaboration of state and federal systems. The statute, recognizing
that juvenile courts have particularized training and expertise in the area of child
welfare and abuse, places critical decisions about the child's best interests and the
possibility of family reunification with state juvenile courts. 5 ' Subsequent
immigration decisions by the INS are then predicated on the determinations of the
juvenile court.
To establish eligibility for special immigrant juvenile status, a child first must
be present in the United States. Most children who benefit from this provision are,
like Laura Arteaga, already living in the United States. Special immigrant juvenile
status, however, is plainly available to children who are intercepted on arrival and
in the custody of the INS, though these children face the tremendous obstacle of
obtaining INS consent to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.159
Next, the applicant must be a child "declared dependent on a juvenile court
located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or
157 A "juvenile court" is defined as any "court located in the United States having
jurisdiction under State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of
juveniles." 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 ](a) (2001).
' "The reliance upon state juvenile courts anticipated in the SIJ statutory scheme signals
Congress' recognition that the states retain primary responsibility and administrative
competency to protect child welfare." Chen, supra note 126, at 609. Congress has generally
limited the federal role in child welfare to setting regulatory standards for state and local child
welfare programs and offering monetary funding incentives to encourage state compliance. The
implementation of systems to protect child welfare has generally been left to the states and
"[t]he federal government's more limited regulatory role in child welfare has resulted in
comparatively less operational capacity in dealing with individual child welfare cases." Id. at
611. Therefore, the federal government "lacks the professional staff and administrative support
to make assessments of individual children's mental and physical conditions and their welfare
needs." Id.
159See id. at 615-16; see also infra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
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placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been
deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or
abandonment."' 60 By regulation, "long-term foster care" means "that a
determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no
longer a viable option.''6 A child who is determined "eligible" for long-term
foster care generally will have been placed in a foster care program, though in
some situations placement with a guardian or adoption based on a determination
of eligibility for long-term foster care is sufficient. 
62
Third, the juvenile court must determine "that it would not be in the alien's
best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of
nationality or country of last habitual residence."' 63  This best-interests
determination, like the determination of eligibility for long-term foster care, is
specifically assigned to the juvenile court and thus takes advantage of the juvenile
court's expertise and experience. The juvenile court decision that it is in the best
interests of a child not to be returned to another country is not an immigration
decision. Rather, the statute requires only that juvenile courts decide issues that
they regularly address: the best interests of a child based on the complex legal and
policy considerations inherent in child welfare matters. The subsequent
immigration consequences of this decision, outside the juvenile court's expertise,
160 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2000). The words "due
to abuse, neglect, or abandonment" were added to the statute in 1997. Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-119, §§ 111, 113 Stat. 2440, 2460. There is "no contemporaneous legislative
history... which explains why SIJ status was originally created in 1990" and "the 1990
definition of Special Immigrant Juvenile contained no requirements that the juvenile be
abandoned, neglected or abused." Yu v. Brown, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1246 (D.N.M. 2000).
Nonetheless, the House Conference Report on the 1997 amendment states that "[t]he language
has been modified in order to limit the beneficiaries of this provision to those juveniles for
whom it was created, namely abandoned, neglected, or abused children." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
105-405, at 130 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2941, 2981.
"' 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (a) (2001).62
"A child who is eligible for long-term foster care will normally be expected to remain
in foster care until reaching the age of majority, unless the child is adopted or placed in a
guardianship situation." 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 1(a) (2001). However, the "court's placement of the
beneficiary in a guardianship situation does not preclude a finding that the beneficiary is
dependent on the juvenile court." In the Matter of Menjivar, at 4 (INS Administrative Appeals
Unit, Dec. 27, 1994) The court held
[that the] acceptance of jurisdiction over the custody of a child by a juvenile court, when
the child's parents have effectively relinquished control of the child, makes the child
dependent upon the juvenile court, whether the child is placed by the court in foster care
or, as here, in a guardianship situation.
Id. 163 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I110 1(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2000).
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are reserved to the INS. 164
Though critical decisions affecting eligibility are delegated to juvenile courts,
the INS retains authority over the final immigration determination. For example,
grounds of inadmissibility and bars to adjustment of status, which apply to all
immigrants, generally are applied to special immigrant juveniles. 61 Waivers of
some grounds of inadmissibility are specifically allowed, and these are
adjudicated by the INS. 166
More centrally, the INS retains control over the ultimate immigration
determination through the requirement that in all cases the Attorney General
"expressly consent[] to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the
grant of special immigrant juvenile status.' 67 In addition to this general consent,
there is a jurisdictional consent provision such that when a child is in the "actual
or constructive custody" of the Attorney General, "no juvenile court has
jurisdiction to determine... custody status or placement of an alien... unless the
Attorney General specifically consents to such jurisdiction.' 161
Although these two consent provisions were enacted in 1997, the INS has yet
to issue regulations regarding their implementation, and it has relied on two
memoranda to set out its interpretation of the consent provisions. 169 As to the
general consent, the INS acknowledges little discretion, stating that where a child
'64 See Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 1999) ("It is the operation of INS rules
that may prevent Gao's deportation, not the action of the county court.").
165 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2000). As initially enacted, the
special immigrant juvenile statute made no special provision for waiving grounds of
inadmissibility, such as bars to the admission of persons likely to become a public charge. Since
juvenile court dependents are public charges by definition, none were admissible under the
original statute which provided no waiver of this ground of inadmissibility. This oversight was
corrected with a technical amendment, yet it delayed the implementation of special immigrant
juvenile status for several years. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, §302, 105 Stat. 1733, 1744-45.
Even then, the statute was not implemented until several years later, after regulations were
finallypromulgated. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2001).
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2000).
167 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2000). The explicit
provision for Attorney General consent as a part of SIJS eligibility was added in 1997. See
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Approwiations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, §113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460-61.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (2000).
169 Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Adjudication
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, Regarding Interim Field Guidance Relating to Public Law
105-119 (Sec. 113) Amending Section 101 (a)(27)(J) of the INA, Special Immigrant Juveniles
(August 7, 1998) (on file with author); Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant
Commissioner, Adjudication Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, Regarding Special
Immigrant Juveniles, Memorandum 2: Clarification Guidance (July 9, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Cook Memorandum #2]. The first memorandum confused the INS consent
required in all cases and the initial consent to jurisdiction of the juvenile court required only in
cases where the child is in INS custody, resulting in the clarification memorandum.
2002]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
is not in INS custody and a juvenile court order sets out the required findings for
special immigrant juvenile status, "consent to the order serving as a precondition
must be granted.' 70 Where a child is in INS custody, the INS states that it
"should consent to the juvenile court's jurisdiction if: (1) it appears that the
juvenile will be eligible for SU status if a dependency order is issued; and (2) in
the judgment of the [INS] district director, the dependency proceeding would be
in the best interest of the juvenile.' 71 As discussed below, it is in the INS's
implementation of both the general and jurisdictional consent provisions that the
influence of the dominant modes of thinking about children in immigration law is
most distinctly visible.
Finally, the special immigrant juvenile statute provides that "no natural parent
or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this
subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right,
privilege, or status under this chapter. '' 172 In other words, if a child is accorded
immigration status on the basis of state dependency and the improbability of
reunification with parents, the parents may not profit from this when the child
becomes an adult and perhaps would like to sponsor them for immigration status.
This statute represents a significant first step toward a more child-centered
approach to thinking about children in immigration law. Merely acknowledging
the reality of children existing separately from parents who are in need of
protection is critical. The statute is strongly grounded in a child-centered
perspective by expressly incorporating the best interests standard as an eligibility
criteria-the statute requires consideration of children's perspectives, necessary to
truly determine their best interests1 73 Yet the statute also strikes a workable
balance between acting in the best interests of children and the need for
meaningful control of immigration by leaving the decisions about the
applicability of grounds of inadmissibility and waivers to the INS.
Perhaps as importantly, the statute locates decisions about the best interests of
the child in juvenile courts, which are far better suited than the INS to ascertain
the best interests of the child and are generally trained and experienced at
listening to children's voices and implementing a child-centered approach to
decision-making. Moreover, most juvenile courts have procedures in place to
ensure that, when needed, a child will have an appointed counsel or guardian ad
170 Id. at 2. In the cases of children not in INS custody, "[j]uvenile courts do not need the
Attorney General's consent to take jurisdiction to issue dependency orders for these juveniles"
and "INS officials should not become involved in juvenile court proceedings in order to consent
to the dependency orders." Id.
171 Id.
172 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(l) (2000).
173 See supra Part 1I.
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litem to facilitate the consideration of the child's perspectives. 74 In this
framework, children are not only recognized as rights holders, but also are
provided a forum with the supports they need to exercise their rights.
B. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status as Implemented
The INS has recognized, in theory at least, the crucial distinction in roles
between it and the juvenile courts and the differences in expertise underlying that
distinction. In promulgating its initial regulations regarding special immigrant
juvenile status, the INS commented that "the decision concerning the best interest
of the child may only be made by the juvenile court." 17 The INS acknowledged
"that it would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely
readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative determinations as to
the juvenile's best interest.' 76 Further, the INS noted that it:
does not intend to make determinations in the course of deportation proceedings
regarding the 'best interest' of a child for the purpose of establishing eligibility
for special immigrant juvenile classification.... [I]t would be impractical and
inappropriate to impose consultation requirements upon the juvenile courts or the
social service system, especially requirements which could possibly delay action
urgently needed to ensure proper care for dependent children.
1 77
In practice, however, the INS has failed to break free of its dominant modes
of thinking about children. The result has been a usurpation of the juvenile court
role and the creation of substantial barriers for abused, neglected, and abandoned
children seeking immigration relief.1 78
This failure is most apparent when children are in INS custody, though it is
not limited to this context.179 In this circumstance, the INS wields tremendous
power via its decision whether to consent to juvenile court jurisdiction.18° In its
guidelines, the INS states that it "should consent to the juvenile court's
jurisdiction if: (1) it appears that the juvenile will be eligible for SIJ status if a
174 Guggenheim, supra note 55, at 305 ("Every state requires that some kind of adult
represent children when their parents or guardians are respondents in local child protection
proceedings.").
175 Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court,
Final Rule, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Supplementary
Information, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,847 (Aug. 12, 1993).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Chen, supra note 126, at 643 ("The SIJ statute removes from the INS the authority for
assessing the minor's personal experience of abuse, neglect or abandonment.").
179 Id. at 613 (noting that "the INS has frequently denied child welfare protection to minors
who are in INS legal custody, despite the fact that they could be eligible for SIJ relief').
1S0 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (2000).
20021 1009
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
dependency order is issued; and (2) in the judgment of the [INS] district director,
the dependency proceeding would be in the best interest of the juvenile." '' The
approach set out in the guidelines undermines the statute's carefully crafted
balance of state and federal decision-making in two ways. First, under this
approach, the INS prejudges precisely the issues that the statute places before the
juvenile court. Second, the guidelines place the INS in the role of making a best
interest determination, a task specifically assigned to the juvenile court and
outside the scope of INS expertise. The INS often confuses these, blending one
into the other as demonstrated below.
Z.Q.L., a seventeen-year-old Chinese girl who claimed to have been
subjected to forced labor, sexual assault, and physical abuse perpetrated by her
mother and other family members, was apprehended by immigration authorities
while attempting to enter the United States.8 2 She obtained pro bono counsel
who requested consent for juvenile court jurisdiction to determine if she met the
requirements for special immigrant juvenile status. While in INS detention over a
period of nearly six months, Z.Q.L. made eight short phone calls to her home,
speaking for a total of eighty-three minutes.'8 3 Without requesting any submission
of documentary evidence or holding any sort of hearing to judge the veracity of
Z.Q.L.'s claims, the INS concluded that:
the evidence submitted is insufficient to support that [Z.Q.L.] is abused,
neglected or abandoned. Additionally, the evidence does not reveal that family
reunification is no longer a viable option. [Z.Q.L.] has been in constant contact
with her family in China by initiating frequent phone calls to her mother. For
these reasons, [Z.Q.L.] is not eligible for long-term foster care; a requirement for
SIJ status. Therefore, the district director cannot conclude that a dependency
proceeding would be in the best interest of the juvenile.184
The determinations made by the INS, without a hearing and without explanation,
are precisely the type of complex child welfare decisions statutorily assigned to
the juvenile court.
The decision that an abused teenage girl, detained in a foreign country, is not
in need of foster care simply because she called her mother, reflects a particularly
unsophisticated understanding of child welfare issues, even without the
complications inherent in the immigration context. As discussed above, the
.8. Cook Memorandum 2, supra note 169, at 2.
"2 See Z.Q.L. v. Perryman, Verified Complaint at In 8-11 (May 30, 2001) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Brian R. Perryman, District Director, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Regarding Z.Q.L., Decision on Consent for
Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court I (May 21, 2001) (on file with author).
83 See Memorandum from Brian R. Perryman, supra note 182, at 2. As a standard
practice, the INS requires children to contact their parents if the parents are reachable.
Telephone Interview with Lisa Frydman, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center (July 26, 2001).
184 Memorandum from Brian R. Penyman, supra note 182, at 5.
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motives underlying decisions to immigrate are complex.'85 Whether the decision
of Z.Q.L. was voluntary or coerced was unclear. The motives of her parents, if
they were involved in the decision at all, were obscure and certainly could range
from well-intentioned to exploitative. The record contained no evidence regarding
their attitude towards Z.Q.L.'s possible return. Mere contact with parents was
manifestly insufficient to make a determination that reunification is in a child's
best interests or even possible. The difficult and subtle determinations that
Z.Q.L.'s situation required are precisely those that the statute assigns to the
juvenile court. Through its practice of prejudging issues reserved to the juvenile
court, the INS removes these decisions from a child-centered forum, subverting
the statute's design to assure that the voices of children are considered.
Moreover, the substance of the INS decision treats Z.Q.L. as an object,
emphasizing parental possession and control while failing to give any weight to
the child's views. The complete disregard of the serious allegations of abuse at the
hands of family members demonstrates a reluctance to question the rights of the
parents. This is hardly surprising given that INS district directors and other
officers who make decisions related to special immigrant juvenile status are not
trained in child welfare.' 16 Merely inserting the phrase "best interest of the child"
into the statute is not sufficient to move these decision makers away from deeply
ingrained notions of children and children's rights that are daily reinforced by
other aspects of their work with immigration law.
Fortunately for Z.Q.L., her pro bono counsel convinced a federal court to
order the INS to consent to juvenile court jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the
juvenile court, working from a more child-centered perspective, found that Z.Q.L.
was eligible for long-term foster care. Unfortunately, the INS approach to Z.Q.L.
was not a singular event.
In May 2000, when INS airport officials determined that a six-year-old girl
nicknamed Fega had arrived alone in New York City from Nigeria with false
documents, they took her into detention and placed her in removal proceedings. 1
87
Fega's father had put her on the plane, to be met by her mother in New York.'
88
Fega's mother, however, did not come forward, reportedly because she lacked
legal immigration status and feared that she would be placed in removal
proceedings herself.'89 Fega remained in INS detention in Miami for more than a
185 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
186 For example, the INS official charged with overseeing juvenile matters in Miami is a
deportation officer whose previous experience is limited to work as a sports trainer and Marine
Corps security guard. Eric Schmitt, INS Both Jailer and Parent to Child Without Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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year.190 Her father sent messages to the INS through a series of relatives, refusing
her return and creating confusion about his whereabouts. 9' Meanwhile, a
contradictory series of contacts with purported aunts, uncles, and cousins left the
INS confused and suspicious about the parents' motives in abandoning the girl.'92
Faced with conflicting information regarding possible placements of the child, the
INS simply left her in detention.' 93
Through pro bono counsel, Fega sought consent of the INS to juvenile court
jurisdiction so that it might make findings establishing her eligibility for foster
care and special immigrant juvenile status. 194 As was the case of Z.Q.L., this is
precisely the type of complex situation that requires expertise in child welfare to
unravel. The INS, however, denied consent, stating that "the evidence
demonstrates that the parents decided to abandon the child mainly to suit two
immigration purposes: obtain lawful permanent resident status for the minor and
allow the mother to evade removal proceedings by the [INS]."' 95 The district
director found that the mother's failure to come forward due to fear of removal
"does not... constitute abandonment.... The district director believes that, in
this case, family reunification will follow as soon as the child is released from
INS custody since that is the only reason they are now separated."' 96 In other
words, Fega is abandoned by her parents, but since the cause of her abandonment
is detention by the INS and the mother's fear of the INS's law enforcement role,
the INS will not recognize this as abandonment.
In its decision, the INS all but labeled Fega an object. The actions and
motives of the INS and her parents, not her own interests, determined her fate.
After more than a year in detention, essentially as bait to lure her undocumented
mother into immigration proceedings, the INS finally released Fega to a cousin.
9 7
The INS still has not consented to juvenile court jurisdiction that might permit her
to obtain stable immigration status.' 98 The failure of the INS to recognize Fega as
a person and consider her interests means that she suffered prolonged detention
and faces an uncertain future.
Fega's situation highlights the conflict inherent in the multiple roles played
"0 Nigerian Girl, 8, Released to Family in Hartford, AssOCIATED PRESS NEwSWiRES,
Aug. 10, 2000, WL APWIRES File [hereinafter Released to Family].
'9' Eric Schmitt, Case of Detained Nigerian Girl Takes U.S. Agency to London, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A 15.
192 Schmitt, supra note 186, at Al; see also Memorandum from James J. Minton, Acting
Assistant District Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Regarding Jane Doe, Decision on Consent for Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court 2-5 (January 10,
2001) (on file with author).
193 See Eric Schmitt, supra note 186, at A 1.
194 Id.
195 Memorandum from James J. Minton, supra note 192, at 8.
196 id. at 9.
197 Released to Family, supra note 190.
198 Id.
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by the INS. Commentators have long decried the conflict in having a single
agency that adjudicates claims for immigration benefits while protecting the
borders and prosecuting violations of immigration laws.' 99 This conflict is at its
height when the INS is not only adjudicator and enforcer, but guardian and
enforcer.2°° Practice has demonstrated that, in reconciling these roles, the role of
immigration law enforcer is dominant and hampers the ability of the INS to serve
as a guardian looking out for the best interests of the child. As one judge
wondered, "What kind of a guardian is the INS where 'the guardian' wants to
deport [the child] and his so-called 'non-guardians,' his foster parents, want to
help him in this country and not deport him. Who is really guarding whom?
20
'
This conflict in detention situations makes the INS practice of appropriating the
role of the juvenile court in deciding best interests all the more improper. The
dominant law enforcement role, with its emphasis on authority and control,
reinforces the INS's dominant mode of thinking about children as objects. The
role conflict thus inhibits the INS from hearing children's voices and stands as a
significant barrier to the adoption of a child-centered approach in reaching
immigration benefit decisions.
The experience of the first few years of implementation of the special
immigrant juvenile statute demonstrates the difficulty that lies ahead in attempts
to move immigration away from deeply ingrained conceptions of children and
children's rights. Despite an innovative statutory design, overcoming dominant
modes of thinking about children has not proven easy. Property-influenced
conceptions of children's rights have continuing effect on decision making,
skewing implementation of the statute so that children are not treated as persons
but as objects. This conception of children, reinforced by the INS's primary role
as an enforcement agency, creates a significant barrier to meaningful reform. The
discussion below turns to the challenges that lie ahead if we are to broaden
thinking about children and enhance child-centered perspectives in the special
immigrant juvenile statute and in immigration law in general.
'99 The INS's "primary missions and functions are to enforce immigration law, monitor
United States borders and ports of entry, and to remove individuals who do not have lawful
immigration status." Chen, supra note 126, at 612. As of fiscal year 2000, the "INS was the
largest federal law enforcement agency in the United States." Immigration and Naturalization
Service, This Month in Immigration History: August 1997, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/
graphics/aboutins/history/5Augl 997.htm.
'00 Chen, supra note 126, at 612 ("he role of the INS is that of a gatekeeper, not a
disinterested party concerned with assessing the needs of children.").
201 In the Matter of Y.W., 1996 WL 665937, at *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 19, 1996) (Randall,
J., concurring specially). This case arose prior to the consent provisions were added to the
special immigrant juvenile statute in 1997. The child had been released from the physical
custody of INS, but the INS retained legal custody. Id. at * I.
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The deeply ingrained conceptions of children's rights that underlie
immigration law continue to shape and color the treatment of children in
immigration matters. As exemplified in the limited conception of a "child" in
immigration law and the resulting treatment of children not fitting in this narrow
category as adults, critical frameworks of immigration simultaneously reflect and
reinforce discredited approaches to children's rights. These dominant conceptions
influence the treatment of children in all immigration matters, limiting children's
status as persons and as individual rights holders. These dominant conceptions of
children's rights also undermine attempts to inject a more child-centered approach
into immigration law.
The experience of implementing the special immigrant juvenile statute
highlights the difficulty in giving effect to even explicitly child-centered
provisions when those provisions are dissonant with the dominant modes of
thinking and practice that form the bulk of the decision maker's work. It is
important that we continue to create and support provisions such as the special
immigrant juvenile statute that provide new approaches to enhance respect for
children's voices and interests. But as long as basic frameworks of immigration
law reinforce limited ideas of children's rights, it will be difficult to meaningfully
advance child-centered perspectives among immigration law decision makers.
This suggests two approaches. First, decisions about children's welfare should be
removed from the INS. Second, and more generally, we should reform
immigration law to remove elements that reinforce discredited conceptions of
children.
Decisions about children's best interests should be located with independent
decision makers who have expertise in child welfare. Such decision makers could
be found in juvenile courts, as in the design of the special immigrant juvenile
statute, but safeguards are required to insure that the INS is not permitted to
circumvent the design. An alternate approach is contained in a bill currently
pending that would create an Office of Children's Services within the Department
of Justice and task it with care and custody of unaccompanied minor children.02
Calls for INS restructuring are commonplace,0 3 and those that have gained the
most support suggest separation of the enforcement and adjudication functions of
the INS.2°4 This proposal approaches this separation by removing a narrow class
of decisions about children's welfare from the INS.
202 The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act, S.B. 121, 107th Cong. (2001).
203 See, e.g., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERs AsSOCIATION, INS REORGANIZATION
ADVOCACY PACKET 1 (July 2, 2001), available at http://www.aila.org/
newsroom/211P1005.html ("Since 1990, when the Commission on Immigration Reform
recommended breaking up the INS, several reorganization proposals have been introduced in
Congress.").204Id.
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Either of these approaches would address the more egregious instances of
INS failure to consider children's interests, such as those arising from the current
conflict inherent in asking the INS to determine a child's best interests while also
carrying out its law enforcement or adjudicatory functions. Both would locate
decisions about child welfare with decision makers who are trained in such
matters, and would provide children with representation independent of the INS.
But these reforms reach only a narrow population of unaccompanied children and
only a narrow class of decisions that may affect them.
Certainly children in particularly vulnerable situations need, indeed demand,
our urgent attention. But changes affecting only relatively small populations of
children are not sufficient. As demonstrated in this article, conceptions about
children's rights influence a tremendous range of decisions made by the INS in a
variety of contexts. Though every decision affecting a child may not expressly be
a best interests determination, conceptions of children and children's rights
inform and influence decision makers in all matters involving children. Infusing
every decision affecting children with an acknowledgement that children's voices
must be heard and that children's best interests are a primary consideration, as
called for in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, requires more general
reform of the treatment of children in immigration law.
The idea that children's rights should inform all mainstream immigration law
and debates should not sound as ambitious as it does. Children comprise one-third
of the annual immigration total in this country-they are not a miniscule special
interest group or an outlier population. We should unabashedly demand that
children's perspectives inform larger discussions of immigration law and policy.
Only then will it be possible to weed out the dominant conceptions of children's
rights lurking in immigration law and practice.
For example, we must reconsider the role of children in family-sponsored
immigration. Questions about the role of family are central to discussions of
immigration reform. 205 Recently, the Commission on Immigration Reform
recommended further strengthening the longstanding bias of immigration law
toward traditional nuclear families.206 Scholars have presented persuasive
arguments regarding the importance of considering alternative conceptualizations
of family, such as extended or nontraditional families.20 7 As the debate about the
nature of family in immigration law continues, the role of children in families
205 See Motomura, supra note 90, at 511 ("In the immigration debate now raging in
Congress, one of the most important questions is how family ties should be taken into
account.").206 U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 59--67 (1997) (proposing to phase out family immigration not based
on nuclear family relationships).
207 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 90, at 971-73; see also Brian McGloin, Note, Diverse
Families with Parallel Needs: A Proposal for Same-Sex Immigration Benefits, 30 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 159 (1999).
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must be central. Many families are organized around children. The reality of
family from the perspective of children must receive as much attention as the
reality of family from the perspective of parents and other less traditional heads-
of-households. Any rethinking of family-sponsored immigration must recognize
children as actors in families and not simply objects.
Similarly, as legislators increasingly discuss the idea that immigrants might
"earn" legal immigration over time, through past employment or through "guest
worker" programs, the perspective of children must not be forgotten.2 °8 Just as
adults grow ties with this country through living and working here, children's
experiences growing up and attending school create equal, if not stronger, bonds
with this country. One hopeful proposal would permit children who have lived in
the United States for more than five years to acquire legal permanent resident
status on the basis of their pursuit of higher education. 20 9 This approach
recognizes children as actors who, based on their own actions and ambitions, may
qualify for immigration status. Such perspectives should be commonplace in
immigration law.
Uncovering the unacknowledged conceptions of children's rights has value in
itself, but is only a first step toward engaging in a broader debate about children's
rights in immigration law.2'10 Other areas of the law that involve children have
engaged in furious and protracted debate about the nature of children and
children's rights.2 1 The very existence of such debates forces serious thought
about children and makes it impossible to ignore children's perspectives. In time,
such debates can lead to a greater understanding of children and a consensus
about aspects of their treatment by the law.212 To move children from objects to
actors in immigration law will require a struggle with the difficult issues of
children's rights raised in the context of immigration law.
208 See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Bush Says Plan for Immigrants Could Expand, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2001, at A 14 (discussing proposal that "new workers with temporary visas could earn
permanent legal residency over time, based on their job history and length of residency, and so
could immigrants already here unlawfully").
209 See The Student Adjustment Act of 2001, H.R. 1918, 107th Cong. (2001), available at
http://theorator.com/billsl07/hrl9l8.html.
210 Kelly, supra note 90, at 945 (arguing that "uncovering the bias leads to questioning its
propriety and working to adapt the law").
211 See supra Part 1H.
212 See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 55, at 310-19 (describing emergence of consensus
regarding aspects of the role of attorneys who represent children).
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